Abstract
The article analyzes the history of the pogrom in Odessa in 1871. The author challenges the version established in liberal historiography, according to which the cause of the pogrom was the inaction of the authorities. The preconditions for the conflict are: the economic competition between the Greek and Jewish communities for dominance in the grain trade, as well as in the deep historical trauma of the Greeks associated with the execution of Patriarch Gregory V in 1821. The course of events and the actions of the authorities are reconstructed in detail. It is shown that Governor-General P. E. Kotzebue, contrary to the established myth, foresaw the threat and took preventive measures (reinforcement of the garrison, negotiations with spiritual leaders), however, they turned out to be insufficient to contain mass violence. The significance of the Odessa events of 1871 was evident not only in their local, but also on a national scale. The pogrom became an alarming precedent, clearly demonstrating to the imperial authorities the ineffectiveness of traditional police methods in the context of urban population growth and intergroup tensions. This forced the government to rely on the regular army as the main force for suppressing civil unrest. Thus, 1871 can be considered the starting point of the process of gradual militarization of the domestic policy of the Russian Empire, which reached its apogee in the era of revolutionary upheavals of the early 20th century. The article contributes to the discussion of the nature of inter-ethnic conflicts in imperial cities and the role of the state in their resolution.